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TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-LESSOR'S RIGHT TO DEPRECIATION 
ALLOWANCES UNDER LONG-TERM LEASE-Plaintiff corporation leased its 
entire railroad property under a long-term lease subject to termination 
at the election of either party, or by breach of die lessee. The lessee 
agreed to preserve, replace, renew and maintain the property during the 
term and to return it upon termination "in at least as good condition 
as at the beginning of the term." Plaintiff, on the other hand, agreed to 
reimburse the lessee for all additions and betterments to the property which 
passed to him upon termination. The government disallowed plaintiff's 
claim for a tax refund based on its right to allow for depreciation, because 
plaintiff's "property would be as valuable at the end of the term as it was 
at the beginning and, therefore, will not depreciate from the standpoint 
of its owner." In a refund proceeding, held, plaintiff will suffer loss from 
obsolescence and depreciation regardless of lessee's covenant.· The agree-
ment to return in as good condition implies no more than to maintain 
in good condition, which does not mean restoring the value of the 
property at the end of the term. North Carolina Midland Railway Co. v. 
United States, (Ct. Cl. 1958) 163 F. Supp. 610. 
When an investor leases his property the lessee may, by undertaking 
various obligations relating to the maintenance or restoration of the 
property, reduce or eliminate losses falling upon the lessor due to wear 
and tear and obsolescence.1 Hence a lessor's right to a depreciation· deduc-
1 See Atlantic Coast Line v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1936) 81 F. (2d) 809, cert. den. 
298 U.S. 656 (1986), rehearing den. 298 U.S. 691 (1986), note, 46 YALE L.J. 172 (1936). 
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tion is ultimately determined by the interpretation given to the lessee's 
obligations under the lease agreement.2 The courts have not been uniform 
in construing many fairly standard lease covenants, when a tax question 
is presented. It seems settled that covenants for the maintenance and repair 
of the property do not preclude the lessor from taking a depreciation 
deduction3 and, conversely, covenants obligating the lessee to restore 
the value or equivalent of the property to the lessor clearly do prevent 
him from claiming a deduction.4 Between these extremes are covenants 
which typically require the lessee to renew and replace the property and 
to return it at the end of the lease in as good condition as it was at 
the beginning of the lease.5 It is in these cases that the courts have taken 
different courses. In one line of cases, the courts have denied the lessor 
a deduction on the theory that since the lessee is to return the property 
in virtually the same condition as when he received it the lessor cannot 
be said to have suffered any economic loss on his investment through 
depreciation.6 This reasoning may be justified if cognizance is taken 
of the relationship between the life of the property and the life of the 
lease.7 Where the lease is longer than the estimated life of the property it 
is reasonable to suppose that the lessee's obligation to renew and replace 
will come into play and thereby prevent any depreciation losses on existing 
property from falling on the lessor.8 This would not preclude a deduction 
for obsolescence on such property that has an estimated life of greater 
duration than the lease, nor on replacement property that becomes 
obsolete to an extent which causes the lessor a loss. In the principal case 
the court rejects this approach by construing the lessee's obligations to 
include no more than a duty to make "necessary" renewals and to "main-
tain" the property in good condition.9 This seems to be an unwarranted 
2 For an extensive discussion and collection of cases on the lessor's right to deduct 
for depreciation, see 40 A.L.R. (2d) 440 (1955). See also 153 A.L.R. 906 (1944). 
s Terminal R. Assn. of St. Louis v. Commissioner, 33 B.T .A. 906 at 909 (1936), affd. 
sub nom. Helvering v. Terminal R. Assn. of St. Louis, (8th Cir. 1937) 89 F. (2d) 739. 
Cases are collected in 40 AL.R. (2d) 440 at 460. 
4 Commissioner v. Terre Haute Electric Co., (7th Cir. 1933) 67 F. (2d) 697 at 698, 
cert. den. 292 U.S. 624 (1934). See also 40 A.L.R. (2d) 440 at 468. 
5 E.g., principal case at 611; Georgia Ry. &: Electric Co. v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 
1935) 77 F. (2d) 897, cert. den. 296 U.S. 601 (1935); Commissioner v. Terre Haute Electric 
Co., note 4 supra. 
6 Georgia Ry.&: Electric Co. v. Commissioner, note 5 supra; Cincinnati Gas &: Electric 
Co. v. Commissioner, 36 B.T .A. 1122 (1937). See Atlantic Coast Line v. Commissioner, 
note I supra. See also note, 43 GEO. L.J. 529 at 531 (1955). 
7 Cincinnati Gas &: Electric Co. v. Commissioner, note 6 supra, at 1127. 
s Ibid. 
9 Principal case at 614. "Surely it is an immaterial difference that in some cases the 
lessee covenanted to maintain the property in good condition, whereas in the instant 
case he undertook to return it in as good condition as it was in the beginning of the 
term. The difference in the phraseology of the two clauses is only in the degree of 
emphasis, rather than in their meaning." 
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dilution of the lease language, achieved by comparing it with other cases 
in which the covenants involved are distinguishable.10 Yet there may be 
some justification for this interpretation since the lease contained a 
thirty-day termination clause which made its duration uncertain and thus 
precluded a comparison of the life expectancies of the property and the 
lease such as suggested above. Furthermore, it is true that such covenants 
are usually construed in the manner most favorable to the lessee.11 The 
lack of uniformity on the part of the courts in dealing with this problem 
might be easily explained and justified if those courts used state law 
to determine the obligations of the parties to the lease and then applied 
tax rules accordingly. However, the courts have looked to other tax cases, 
regardless of locus, to find the proper construction for the lease covenants. 
Long-term leases have become commonplace and almost without exception 
contain covenants concerning the lessee's duty for the care of the property. 
The tax consequences of such lease covenants undoubtedly play an im-
portant part in the making of leases; consequently, some degree of uni-
formity in the interpretation of these covenants for tax purposes is a 
worthwhile goal. This uniformity might be achieved in either of two 
ways: (1) the tax code might be amended to provide in the future for a 
standard interpretation of such typical lease covenants as found in the 
principal case, or (2) the courts might interpret the lease covenants under 
the law of the state where the property is located. The latter course is 
preferable because it would avoid forcing prospective lessors and lessees 
to draft leases with an eye to conflicting interpretations of their covenants 
by the state courts on one hand and the federal courts, for tax purposes, on 
the other. 
E. Roger Frisch, S.Ed. 
10 T-he court in the principal case at 613 cites Helvering v. Terminal R. Assn. of 
St. Louis, note 3 supra, in support of its holding. But the court in that case stated at 742 
that their " ••• conclusion is much fortified •by the limitation of the renewals to 'neces-
sary' renewals." The court also cites Alaska Realty Co. v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1944) 
141 F. (2d) 675 as support, but in that case the court emphasized, at 676, the "obligation to 
repair and replace ••• whenever necessary ••• " and also distinguished cases involving 
railroad equipment. 
11 E.g., HoIIywood Bldg. Corp. v. Greenview Amusement Co., 315 m. App. 658 at 
661, 43 N.E. (2d) 566 (1942); Lehmeyer v. Moses, 69 Misc. 476 at 482, 127 N.Y. S. 253 
(1910). See also 45 A.L.R. 12 at 30 (1926). 
